| 引用本文: | 张亚健,王子怡,陈 茨,等.考虑电制氢辅助的配电网主从博弈电压随机优化控制[J].电力系统保护与控制,2026,54(05):49-60. |
| ZHANG Yajian,WANG Ziyi,CHEN Ci,et al.Stochastic voltage optimization control of distribution networks assisted by power-to-hydrogen based on a leader-follower game[J].Power System Protection and Control,2026,54(05):49-60 |
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| 摘要: |
| 高比例新能源并网对配电网电压稳定构成严峻挑战，而氢能凭借其高密度、零碳排、高热值等优势，可作为新型调压资源主动参与电压控制，有效提升系统电压韧性。因此，提出一种利用电制氢(power to hydrogen, P2H)辅助的配电网主从博弈电压控制策略。首先，考虑到配电网运营商、电制氢运营商和储能运营商间的利益冲突，建立P2H参与的主从博弈双层优化模型。以配电网运营商作为领导者，配电网运行成本最小为目标，制定相应的电价补贴，引导电制氢运营商、储能运营商调整自身用电行为，保证配电网的电压稳定性。其次，考虑到实际情况源荷的不确定性，设计了基于拉丁超立方抽样的日内随机优化算法。最后，算例结果表明，所提出的模型能够有效提升配电网电压的稳定性，且配电网运营商总运行成本较不含P2H的场景降低了14.56%，较未设置激励机制的场景降低了5.67%。 |
| 关键词: 电制氢 主从博弈 配电网 不确定性 电压控制 |
| DOI：10.19783/j.cnki.pspc.250824 |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目:国家自然科学基金项目资助(62533016，62573279)；上海市自然科学基金项目资助(25ZR1402170，24ZR1421600) |
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| Stochastic voltage optimization control of distribution networks assisted by power-to-hydrogen based on a leader-follower game |
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ZHANG Yajian1, WANG Ziyi1, CHEN Ci1, 2, PENG Chen1, DENG Li1, XUE Fei3, ZHANG Ningbo4
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1. School of Mechatronic Engineering and Automation, Shanghai University, Shanghai 200444, China; 2. Power China Guiyang
Engineering Corporation Limited, Guiyang 550081, China; 3. Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an 710049, China; 4. Electric
Power Research Institute of State Grid Ningxia Electric Power Co., Ltd., Yinchuan 750001, China
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| Abstract: |
| The high penetration of renewable energy poses severe challenges to distribution network voltage stability. Hydrogen energy, with advantages such as high density, zero carbon emissions, and high calorific value, can serve as a new voltage regulation resource and actively participate in voltage control, thereby effectively enhancing system voltage resilience. Accordingly, a leader-follower (Stackelberg) game-based voltage control strategy for distribution networks assisted by power-to-hydrogen (P2H) is proposed. First, a bilevel game optimization model incorporating P2H participation is established considering the conflicting interests among the distribution system operator, the P2H operator, and the energy storage operator. With the distribution system operator acting as the leader and minimizing operating costs as the objective, electricity price subsidies are designed to guide the P2H and energy storage operators to adjust their electricity consumption behaviors, thereby ensuring voltage stability of the distribution network. Second, to account for source-load uncertainties in practical operation, an intra-day stochastic optimization algorithm using Latin hypercube sampling is developed. Finally, case study results show that the proposed model can effectively improve voltage stability in the distribution network. Moreover, the total operating cost of the distribution system operator is reduced by 14.56% and 5.67% compared to the scenarios without P2H and without an incentive mechanism, respectively. |
| Key words: power-to-hydrogen (P2H) Stackelberg game distribution network uncertainty voltage control |
