| 引用本文: | 王小君,李晓刚,杨立兵,等.华东跨省集中交易中发电企业结盟报价实证研究[J].电力系统保护与控制,2013,41(9):106-111. |
| WANG Xiao-jun,LI Xiao-gang,YANG Li-bing,et al.An empirical study on the power producers’ collusion bidding in the trans-provincial electric power market of East China Power Grid[J].Power System Protection and Control,2013,41(9):106-111 |
|
| 摘要: |
| 发电厂商为获取更多收益，在市场竞争中有时会采取类似“串谋”的结盟报价行为抬高市场报价。以我国实际运营的华东电网跨省集中交易的实际数据为例研究了发电厂商结盟报价行为。首先对部分月份发电厂商的报价数据进行概率分析，确认其为结盟报价。在此基础上，基于合作博弈的基本原理分析了发电厂商结盟报价的内在机理，给出了市场规则与结盟报价之间的关系，进而提出了抑制发电厂商结盟报价的建议措施。理论分析以及市场实践均验证了所提措施的有效性。 |
| 关键词: 电力市场 跨省集中交易 市场力 串谋 |
| DOI：10.7667/j.issn.1674-3415.2013.09.017 |
| 分类号: |
| 基金项目:华东电网有限公司科技项目（D010010173） |
|
| An empirical study on the power producers’ collusion bidding in the trans-provincial electric power market of East China Power Grid |
|
WANG Xiao-jun,LI Xiao-gang,YANG Li-bing,et al
|
| Abstract: |
| To accrue more profits in market competitions, the power producers sometimes would adopt the collusion bidding strategy to force up prices. The paper discusses the collusion bidding behavior of the power producers, which is based on the actual running data of trans-provincial electric power market of the East China Power Grid. Firstly, the probability analysis based on the bidding data of the monthly producers is used to confirm whether it is a collusion one. On this foundation, based on the basic principles of the cooperative game, we analyze the internal mechanisms of the collusion bidding, and show the relationship between market rules and this behavior. Furthermore, several possible strategies are proposed to inhibit it. Both the theoretical analysis and the market practice show the effectiveness of the proposed strategies. |
| Key words: electricity market trans-provincial electricity auction market power collusion |
